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Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement's
Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular
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The Fourth Amendment does, of course, leave room for the
employment of modem technology in criminal law enforcement, but
.. . electronic monitoring, subject only to the self-restraint of law
enforcement officials, has no place in our society.
-Justice John Harlan 11*
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 1062
II. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW: THE TECHNOLOGICAL BASIS OF
TRACKING AND POSSIBLE LAW ENFORCEMENT USES ............................ 1063
A. GPS Tracking Devices ............................................ 1063
B. Cellular Phone Site Location ...................................... 1066
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S FRAMEWORK OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS FOR
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
D OCTRINE .......................................................... 1069
IV. THE CURRENT COURTS ARE SPLIT ON THE LEGALITY OF WARRANTLESS POLICE
USE OF BoTH GPS DEVICES AND CELLULAR PHONE TRACKING.................. 1072
A. Some Courts Have Held that a Warrant Is Necessary for Police to Engage
in GPS Tracking Due to the Intrusive Nature of this Technology that Goes
Beyond Mere Sense-augmented Surveillance .......................... 1073
B. Some Courts Have Held that Warrantless GPS Tracking is Constitutional,
as the Level of Intrusiveness Raises No Fourth Amendment Concerns .... 1077
C. The Statutory Debate over Governmental Access to Prospective, Real-time
Cellular Phone Site Information ....... ............................ 1079
1. SOME COURTS HAVE HELD THAT A PROBABLE CAUSE SHOWING IS
REQUIRED FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TO OBTAIN CELLULAR LOCATION
INFORMATION FROM SERVICE PROVIDERS .......................... 1080
2. SOME COURTS HAVE HELD THAT A BURDEN OF SPECIFIC AND
ARTICULABLE FACTS IS REQUIRED FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TO OBTAIN
CELLULAR LOCATION INFORMATION FROM SERVICE PROVIDERS .......... 1082
V. GPS TRACKING AND CELLULAR PHONE TRACKING SHOULD BE DEEMED A
SEARCH WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, REQUIRING
POLICE TO OBTAIN A WARRANT BEFORE USE ............................ 1083
A . GPS Tracking ................................................... 1083
t J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Miami School of Law; B.B.A. 2007, University of
Miami. I would like to thank my family for their constant support in everything that I do.
* United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 790 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
B. Cellular Phone Tracking .......................................... 1086
V I. CONCLUSION ........................................................ 1089
I. INTRODUCTION
Times have changed since telephones were hardwired to homes and
people read maps to navigate their travels. Today, portable cellular
phones dominate the communication world, and Global Positioning Sys-
tem, or GPS, technology guides users via satellite. These new technolo-
gies provide countless benefits to citizens and have greatly transformed
our society. However, such conveniences do not come without a cost.
While portable cell phones and GPS devices follow us around every-
where we go, these technologies also allow us to be followed every-
where we go.
Vehicle GPS tracking and cellular phone location tracking are new
methods of surveillance, which use emerging forms of technology.
These practices require judicial attention, as they can lead to major con-
stitutional issues when law enforcement improperly uses them. Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns arise when police use new methods of
technology without a warrant and collect information in which an indi-
vidual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. These two new technolo-
gies allow law enforcement to continuously track people by way of their
cellular telephone or vehicle, usually without the user's knowledge.
Advanced and powerful methods of surveillance can be overly intrusive
by providing an abundance of information in real time about the private
daily activities of every person.
Many people undervalue this type of tracking and do not see it as a
great invasion of privacy. For instance, one might think it does not mat-
ter if the police are aware that he goes to lunch at a specific restaurant
everyday or that he attends a certain church service every Sunday. How-
ever, this line of thinking misses a larger point. If someone has the abil-
ity to know the real-time location of a person around the clock, then one
is able to create a full picture of that person's life. One learns everything
about that person, much of which is highly personal and private in
nature, going beyond what both the individual and society would con-
sider a reasonable expectation of privacy.
This article explains why the Supreme Court needs to address the
constitutional implications of warrantless law-enforcement surveillance
methods of GPS tracking devices and cellular site location tracking. Part
II discusses the history of both GPS devices and cellular telephones,
describing the many uses for both citizens and law enforcement. Part III
examines the framework of the Fourth Amendment analysis, outlining
the Supreme Court's historical treatment of emerging technologies and
1062 [Vol. 64:1061
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the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine. Part V discusses how
the current courts are split as to the constitutionality of warrantless
tracking by GPS devices and cellular telephone site location. Part V
argues that, under the existing framework for analyzing enhanced sur-
veillance, the Court should find that both of these technologies transmit
information in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy and, therefore, they should fall within the purview of the Fourth
Amendment, requiring police to obtain a warrant prior to use.
I. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW: THE TECHNOLOGICAL
BASIS OF TRACKING AND POSSIBLE LAW-ENFORCMENT USES
A. GPS Tracking Devices
The Global Positioning System is a satellite-based navigation sys-
tem, which the U.S. Department of Defense developed in the early
1970s.1 Today, GPS is also widely available to citizens, and the U.S. Air
Force maintains it through a system that is accessible to both military
and civilian users.2
GPS has three main components. First, a network of satellites orbits
about 20,000 kilometers above the earth's surface and transmits ranging
signals on two frequencies in the microwave part of the radio spectrum.3
The specific number of these satellites has consistently increased from
the first full constellation of twenty-four satellites in 1994,' up to the
current network of thirty satellites, to ensure greater operability and
accuracy of GPS.5 Second, a control segment maintains GPS through a
system of ground-monitor stations and satellite-upload facilities.6 Third,
user-receivers on Earth process the signals of at least four of these satel-
lites, figure out the distance to each, and use this information to mathe-
matically determine the receiver's location, velocity, and time.7 This
process of determining a position from measurements of distances is
known as trilateration (as opposed to triangulation, which involves the
measurement of angles).8 Additionally, weather conditions do not affect
GPS, allowing for continuous positioning and timing information
1. AHMED EL-RABBANY, INTRODUCTION TO GPS: THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM 1
(2002).
2. Richard B. Langley, In Simple Terms, How Does GPS Work?, Mar. 24, 2003, http:l/gge.
unb.ca/Resources/HowDoesGPSWork.html.
3. Id.
4. See SCOTT PACE ET AL., THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: ASSESSING NATIONAL
POLICIES 246 (1995).
5. Langley, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. See Marshall Brain & Tom Harris., How GPS Receivers Work, How STUFF WORKS, Sept.
25, 2006, http://adventure.howstuffworks.com/gps.htmi.
8. Langley, supra note 2.
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twenty-four hours a day anywhere in the world.9
As GPS technology advances, receiver accuracy levels greatly
increase as well. Currently, a basic receiver can accurately determine its
position within a few meters.' ° Further, by using a common process
know as differential GPS, which incorporates additional correction sig-
nals to account for problems like atmospheric interference, a receiver
can improve its positioning accuracy to within centimeters. 1
Over the past five years, there has been a vast increase in the popu-
larity, availability, and affordability of GPS technology: "The Consumer
Electronics Association estimates 20 percent of American households
[currently] own a portable GPS system and 9 percent have vehicles
equipped with in-dash systems." 12 Additionally, this increase is evident
through the soaring end-of-year GPS sales estimates in the United
States, generating over four-billion dollars in 2007.13 This increase in
sales has been assisted by the drastic price decrease of GPS devices in
the past three years. The average price of personal GPS devices has
dropped almost fifty percent, from $322 in 2006 to $171 in 2007,14 and
many units are now available for less than $150.
In addition to drivers using GPS vehicle navigation systems to plot
directions, GPS now has a variety of other uses, such as: allowing emer-
gency services, including 911 or roadside assistance, to pinpoint the
location of those in need of assistance; helping keep track of family
members, either children or elderly members, so they do not wander off
alone; easily finding lost pets using collars with built-in GPS; and
allowing employers to keep tabs on employee hours or vehicle travel.' 5
GPS has even spread to the world of sports and can be used during a
round of golf. A new waterproof, handheld GPS device uses the satel-
lite-based GPS network and "calculates a golfer's distance to the center
of the green or other features of the golf course, so he can select the
proper club." 16 GPS has uses in all areas of our lives, affecting and help-
ing each of us in ways we may not even realize.
9. EL-RABBANY, supra note 1, at 1.
10. Langley, supra note 2.
11. PACE ET AL., supra note 4, app. A at 226.
12. Mitch Stacy, Small GPS Devices Help Prosecutors Win Convictions, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 30, 2008, available at http:/lwww.policeone.comlpolicetechnology/software/GS/mapping
articles/1730192-Small-GPS-devices-help-prosecutors-winconvictions/.
13. See GPS Purchases to Generate $4.1 Billion in Sales in 2007, GPS WORLD, May 2007,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ni_m0BPW/is_- 5_18/ai-n27257020/?tag=content;col 1.
14. See Saul Hansell, As Tech Buying Slows, G.P.S. Stays the Course, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 5,
2007, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.comV2007/1 2/05/as-tech-buying-slows-gps-stays-the-course/.
15. See Simon Wyryzowski, 12 Practical Uses of GPS for Everyday People, EZINEARTICLES,
Sept. 21, 2005, http://ezinearticles.com/?12-Practical-Uses-of-GPS-for-Everyday-People&id=
74085.
16. See GPS Comes to the Golf Course, Posting of Brad Stone & Matt Richtel to N.Y. Times
1064 [Vol. 64:1061
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In addition to the numerous benefits GPS has for consumers, this
technology provides assistance in the field of law enforcement. GPS is
applicable to a wide variety of law-enforcement problems and offers
police substantial aid in each situation. For example, law-enforcement
officials have used GPS in auto-theft sting operations 7 and to monitor
the whereabouts of parolees. 8 Further, police have attempted to use
records from suspects' personal, portable GPS devices as evidence of
criminal activity. In Pennsylvania, "a trucker's GPS ...led police to
charge him with setting his own home on fire [after] GPS records
showed his rig was parked about 100 yards from his house at the time of
the fire."' 9
Most importantly, GPS receivers can be outfitted with wireless
transmitters that send location information to third parties.2" The third
party can then remotely monitor the precise location of the GPS receiver
from a tracking center.2 ' These features help law enforcement enhance
covert-surveillance operations. Without a suspect's knowledge, police
could approach a suspect's vehicle, magnetically attach a GPS tracking
device to the vehicle's undercarriage, and view data from the device
over a desktop or laptop computer.22 These systems are capable of last-
ing for weeks at a time, allowing police constart, real-time, and precise
location information about that vehicle for much longer than they practi-
cally might be able to maintain round-the-clock visual surveillance.23
This pervasive technology of remote suspect tailing is often conducted
without a warrant, and, because the GPS devices used by law enforce-
ment do not actually record conversations, they fall outside the scope of
laws regulating wiretaps and similar forms of electronic surveillance.24
To date, law-enforcement agencies have used these GPS features in
Bits Blog, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/gps-comes-to-the-golf-course/ (Jan. 8, 2009,
12:42 EST).
17. See State v. Johnson, No. 84282, 2005 WL 77090, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2005).
18. See Chism v. State, 813 N.E.2d 402, 406 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated, 824 N.E.2d 334
(Ind. 2005).
19. Stacy, supra note 12.
20. Rende McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up In Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 418 (2007).
21. Id.
22. See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 221 (Wash. 2003) (en banc).
23. Id. at 223.
24. Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHfo N.U. L. REv. 295, 315 (2004).
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murder investigations,25 robbery investigations,26 drug investigations,27
and public corruption cases.2"
Thus, it is clear that law enforcement may find GPS technology
useful in a variety of contexts and for a variety of purposes. However,
law enforcement's ability to use GPS to so scrupulously monitor indi-
viduals raises substantial Fourth Amendment concerns. As law enforce-
ment's use of GPS has grown in recent years, so too have the challenges
that defendants have raised, with most alleging Fourth Amendment vio-
lations due to warrantless use of GPS devices.
B. Cellular Phone Site Location
Today, there are more than 262 million cellular-phone subscribers
in the United States.29 Almost sixteen percent of United States house-
holds rely on wireless phones as their only source of telephone
communication.3 °
Wireless technology operates through a network of cell towers that
emit radio frequencies capable of carrying calls, text messages, and
other data.3 ' Cell towers are similar to traditional radio towers; however,
they emit frequencies with much lower power, which allows many peo-
ple in a small area to dommunicate over the same frequencies without
interference.32 These cell towers are distributed throughout a coverage
area and are usually much closer together in big cities with large num-
bers of users.33 Additionally, cell phone users are often in range of more
than one cell tower at a given time.34
25. See Jackson, 76 P.3d at 221 (stating that detailed GPS information, including locations of
the suspect's truck for exact periods of time, led to the discovery of a missing nine-year-old
victim's body).
26. See People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, *1-2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. May 6,
2004) (showing police used information from a placed GPS tracker as evidence of a robbery
suspect's location near several robberies), affd, 887 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 2009).
27. See United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing how police
placed a GPS tracker on a drug suspect's vehicle and used it to track the suspect on trips to a
marijuana field).
28. Brandon Bain, 'Big Brother' Is Boss; Workers Object to Babylon's Satellite Tracking
System, NEWSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), Mar. 13, 2006, at A06 (describing how the police
department in Clinton Township, New Jersey, installed GPS devices on several department patrol
cars as part of an internal investigation of its own officers).
29. CTIA-TtE WiRELEss ASS'N, CTIA's SEMI-ANNUAL WIRELESS INDUSTRY SURVEY
(2008), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA Survey.Mid-Year_2008_Graphics.pdf.
30. Ryan Randazzo, Quest Seeks Exemption on Rates, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 11, 2008, at I.
31. See Marshall Brain, Jeff Tyson & Julia Layton, How Cell Phones Work, How STUFF
WORKS, Nov. 10, 2000, http://www.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone.htm.
32. See id.
33. See Posting of Tom Farley & Mark van der Hoek to Privateline, http://www.privateline.
com/mt_cellbasics (Jan. 1, 2006, 23:07 EST).
34. See Brain et a]., supra note 31.
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A significant characteristic of cellular phones is that they constantly
relay their locations to cellular towers in order to have the strongest
possible signal and to allow the next inbound call to be received without
a delay.35 This process, called registration, occurs every seven seconds,
without the user of the phone needing to take any action, and the user is
usually unaware that these signals are even being sent.36 The informa-
tion that service providers transmit and store, often called cell-site infor-
mation, includes the subscriber's ten-digit phone number and a thirty-
two-digit phone-identification number.3 7 The only way for a user to stop
these signals is to turn the phone off.38
During phone calls, cellular systems are managed by mobile tele-
phone switching offices that locate users based on tower signals and
send incoming calls to their phones through the nearest tower.39 As a
user's location moves toward a closer tower during a call, the tower
being used will switch through Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) or
Angle of Arrival (AOA) methods, measuring the strength of signal and
thus the location of the cell phone."° To calculate the approximate loca-
tion, TDOA measures the amount of time it takes a signal to travel from
the phone to the tower, while AOA measures the angle at which the
tower receives the phone's signal." The accuracy of location tracking
depends on the geographic region, as the more densely placed the phone
towers, the more accurate the location data will be. In urban areas with
many towers, this location information can be within the range of a
couple hundred feet, while in rural areas with fewer towers, the informa-
tion can be within a few miles."2
Though these features only reveal the general location of the user,
other variations of wireless phone tracking permit location of the user
with much greater accuracy. "Facing" is one feature that allows for a
more accurate location range. Cell towers contain three sets of 120-
degree panels, and the location of a user's phone can be found by deter-
35. Farley & van der Hoek, supra note 33.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Id. The purpose of this registration information is also based on billing rates for the cell
phone service provider. See id. These signals allow providers to know the location of the phone
and whether the phone is roaming, in order to apply the proper billing charges for these calls. See
id.
39. See Brain et al., supra note 31.
40. Kevin McLaughlin, Note, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking:
Where Are We? 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 426 (2007); see also Brain et al., supra
note 31.
41. McLaughlin, supra note 40, at 426.
42. See In re Applications of U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section
2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 n.3 (D. Mass. 2007).
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mining which of these panels is communicating with the user's phone.43
An even more precise method of location occurs through a process
called "triangulation," which uses AOA or TDOA to calculate the rela-
tive signal strength of the three nearest cellular towers."
The ability for such accurate location tracking has socially benefi-
cial applications, most notably the ability to pinpoint the location of 911
emergency calls made from cellular phones.45 Other daily examples of
this technology include keeping track of family members, especially
children or spouses, and employers using the technology in businesses to
log the location of mobile employees.46
Just as cellular phone tracking is desired by civilians, this powerful
and advanced method of surveillance has also been highly sought after
by law-enforcement agencies. Law-enforcement officials are especially
interested in this information because they can use it to determine a sus-
pect's approximate location and to track his or her movements.47 The
major issue with this is that cell phone companies usually own the cell
towers, and these companies are in control of the relevant information.48
This type of electronic surveillance is generally governed by the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).49 Pursuant to the
requirements of the ECPA, for law enforcement to obtain location track-
ing information, they must seek a court order requiring the cellular ser-
vice provider to turn over this data."° The current debate is centered on
the legal standard required for obtaining these orders. Some courts indi-
cate that the government only has the burden of proving specific and
articulable facts, and sometimes even less, for these orders. However,
other courts require the government to provide a showing of probable
cause to obtain the orders.5 '
Finally, the type of tracking information sought by law enforcement
is an issue affecting this controversy. Police may request that a service
provider turn over the stored records of cell location data to reconstruct a
picture of where a suspect was located at a given time in the past.52 This
43. See McLaughlin, supra note 40, at 427; Farley & van der Hoek, supra note 33.
44. McLaughlin, supra note 40, at 427.
45. See David Colker, Go Ahead, Just Try to Disappear; Global Positioning Technology on
Mobile Phones and Other Devices Can Track Errant Workers, Teens or Even Pets, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 2004, at Al.
46. See id.
47. See United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 947 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated sub nom. Garner
v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005).
48. See Ian James Samuel, Note, Warrantless Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324,
1327-28 (2008).
49. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
50. Id. § 2516.
51. See infra notes 157-73 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., In re Application of the US. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of
1068 [Vol. 64:1061
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information, called "historical data," is limited in value and usually pro-
duces a lower level of concern from privacy advocates.53 Alternately,
law enforcement may seek real-time tracking information about individ-
uals. 4 When this type of information is sought, law enforcement must
ask the court for a prospective order because such real-time data is
inherently not yet in existence at the time of the request.
5 5
In light of the vast increase in mobile technology and the large
debate within the courts on the topic, there is a strong need for Fourth
Amendment guidance in this area. Similar to the recent law-enforcement
use of GPS tracking devices, use of this cellular phone tracking informa-
tion raises numerous privacy issues. This powerful investigative tool can
reveal sensitive information and can be overly intrusive if used without a
warrant. Moreover, as most Americans voluntarily carry cell phones,
cell phone tracking is different from the surveillance technology of the
past.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S FRAMEWORK OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.56
The courts will find a search unreasonable, and therefore unconstitu-
tional, if it is conducted without a warrant, unless "exceptional circum-
stances" are shown.5 7 For the warrant protections of the Fourth
Amendment to become relevant, the use of these emerging technologies
by law enforcement must be deemed a search.58 If no search occurred,
the Fourth Amendment does not apply.
Historically, the inquiry over whether a search took place under the
Fourth Amendment focused on if a physical trespass had occurred. 59 The
a Pen Register & a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. [Sealed] & [Sealed] & the Prod. of Real
Time Cell Site Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 2005) [hereinafter Maryland].
53. McLaughlin, supra note 40, at 432.
54. See Maryland, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
55. Id.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948).
58. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) ("[T]he taking of aerial photographs ... is not a search
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.").
59. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31; see, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928)
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Supreme Court altered this line of thinking in the seminal case Katz v.
United States.6° The Court held for the first time that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,' 6' and that the Fourth Amend-
ment's purpose is to protect individuals' reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy from government intrusion.62 The context of the Katz decision
indicates that the Court was attentive to the effects of emerging technol-
ogy and factored in the ability of police to obtain information without
any physical intrusion.63
The Supreme Court from then on adopted Justice Harlan's two-
pronged formulation of Fourth Amendment application as the standard
analysis for determining whether or not a search has occurred. Under
this method there are two requirements necessary to find that a person
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The inquiry is as follows:
"[F]irst, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "" Using this formula, the Court uses
intrusiveness to measure objective reasonableness. The question of
whether a search occurred has become a matter of case-by-case, technol-
ogy-by-technology analysis.
We can further learn how the Court treats emerging technologies by
examining the line of post-Katz surveillance cases. These cases dealt
with the warrantless use of new forms of surveillance in which the
Court's focus was the specific type of technology used and the level of
information it revealed. In United States v. Caceres,65 the Court faced
the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment prohibited use of a record-
ing device during conversations with the defendant.66 The Court held
that it did not and declined to define the use of the device as search.6 7
The Court reasoned that the information received from the recording
device was merely equivalent to an agent taking written notes; so no
invasion of the defendant's expectation of privacy had occurred.6 8
In the same year, the Court considered the warrantless use of a pen
(describing how a Fourth Amendment violation depended on whether officers penetrated the
defendants' home), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
60. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
61. Id. at 351.
62. Id. at 351-53.
63. See id. at 352-53.
64. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
65. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
66. Id. at 743.
67. Id. at 744.
68. See id. at 751.
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register by law enforcement.69 In Smith v. Maryland, the Court held that
no search had occurred from use of the pen register and allowed war-
rantless use of the technology.7 ° The Court explained that in dialing a
phone number, the user is voluntarily conveying the number to the
phone company and thus assumes the risk that this information may be
passed on to the police." Further, the Court characterized a pen register
as a sense-augmenting device because it discloses only the number that
has been dialed; it does not reveal any other information about the caller
or recipient.7"
The next category of surveillance technology that the Court
addressed was a battery-operated beeper that acts as a tracking device by
emitting a weak radio signal, which can be followed by a nearby agent
with a receiver.73 The Court analyzed the warrantless use of these elec-
tronic beepers in United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo.
In Knotts, law-enforcement officers obtained consent from a chemi-
cal manufacturing company to install a tracking beeper inside a
container of chloroform, and then tracked defendant's movements when
he later transported the container.74 The Court classified this type of
device as merely sense augmenting, because normal visual surveillance
alone would also have allowed the police to view the movements of the
container.75 The Court found there was no violation of any reasonable
expectation of privacy when the beeper was used to simply follow the
movements of the individuals in plain view on public thoroughfares7 6
Thus, the Court found that use of the beeper did not amount to a search,
and no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.7 7
In contrast, the Court in Karo held that warrantless use of an elec-
tronic tracking beeper constituted a search and violated the Fourth
Amendment when law enforcement used the beeper to establish its loca-
tion inside a private home.78 The Court acknowledged the limited nature
of information available through beeper technology, but focused on the
69. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979). "A pen register is a mechanical device
that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when
the dial on the telephone is released." Id. n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. at 745-46.
71. Id. at 744-45. The assumption of risk analysis stemmed from the line of cases starting
with United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), holding that a person has no expectation of
privacy in financial information voluntarily exchanged to a bank.
72. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
73. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983); see also United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705 (1984).
74. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
75. Id. at 285.
76. Id. at 281.
77. Id. at 284-85.
78. Karo, 468 U.S. at 718.
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fact that the beeper revealed information about the inside of the home
that could not have been otherwise obtained without a warrant. 79 The
Court recognized that society has an objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy within the home.8°
Most recently, the Court extended its analysis of electronic surveil-
lance to thermal imaging devices.8" In Kyllo v. United States, federal
agents suspected that the defendant was growing marijuana in his home,
so they used a thermal-imaging device to determine that a relatively high
level of heat was radiating from the defendant's home and used this
information to secure a search warrant.82 The Court found that the ther-
mal imager was used as an extrasensory device because it revealed
information regarding the interior of the home, and because the informa-
tion was virtually unavailable to the average person.8 3 The Court held
that use of the technology constituted a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment and was unconstitutional without a warrant.84
The Supreme Court's framework of analysis for emerging surveil-
lance technologies provides some indication of how it may handle an
inevitable challenge to GPS tracking or cell phone site tracking. The key
inquiry is how the Court will characterize the technology and whether it
believes an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
information being revealed.
IV. THE CURRENT COURTS ARE SPLIT ON THE LEGALITY OF
WARRANTLESS POLICE USE OF BOTH GPS DEVICES AND
CELLULAR PHONE TRACKING
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the emerging use of both
GPS and cellular telephone site tracking by law enforcement. This issue
is not premature and must be dealt with, as significant confusion exists
among the lower courts and states on the legality of obtaining informa-
tion via these techniques without a warrant. Courts have been divided
mainly on the application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test to
these new technologies. Additional challenges are inevitable, especially
as the technology becomes more affordable and widely used by smaller
police departments and the public alike. State and federal courts will be
increasingly called upon to strike the proper balance between legitimate
law enforcement objectives and maintenance of constitutional guaran-
79. Id. at 715.
80. Id. at 714.
81. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
82. Id. at 30.
83. Id. at 37-38.
84. Id. at 40.
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tees in light of technological advances. These disagreements indicate
that the Supreme Court will likely need to decide a case on both GPS
use and cellular phone tracking in the near future.
A. Some Courts Have Held that a Warrant Is Necessary for Police
to Engage in GPS Tracking Due to the Intrusive Nature of this
Technology that Goes Beyond Mere Sense-augmented Surveillance
To date, four state courts have concluded (or assumed) that the use
of a GPS device requires some form of prior judicial authorization. Two
of these courts held that law enforcement violate their respective state
constitutions when they place GPS tracking devices on vehicles without
a warrant." The third court assumed "without deciding, that the GPS
surveillance of defendant's vehicle was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment .... ,"86 The fourth state court held that probable
cause is required for installation of a GPS tracking device, without rul-
ing on the necessity of a warrant.87
The most prominent GPS tracking case to recognize the constitu-
tional implications of the technology is State v. Jackson, in which the
Supreme Court of Washington became the first state court to deal with
the question of whether a warrant is required for law enforcement to use
GPS tracking of a criminal suspect.88 In Jackson, police suspected that
the defendant, William Bradley Jackson, had murdered his nine-year old
daughter, and, based on that belief, the police obtained a warrant to
impound and search two vehicles belonging to the defendant.89 Without
Jackson's knowledge, police obtained a second warrant for the installa-
tion of GPS tracking devices on the impounded vehicles and returned
the cars to Jackson without informing him the devices had been put in.90
For nearly a month the police monitored the devices, logging Jackson's
location information and the time he spent at each site. 9' The GPS
devices eventually led the police to the location where Jackson had
dumped the daughter's body, and Jackson was later convicted of murder
following a jury trial.92
85. People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. May 6, 2004)
(finding that a warrant is required to install a GPS tracking device on a vehicle), aff'd, 887
N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 2009); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003) (en banc)
(finding that a warrant must be obtained prior to installation and use of a GPS device).
86. People v. Obujen, No. H026715, 2005 WL 519233, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2005).
87. See State v. Scott, No. 02-02-00121-I, 2006 WL 2640221, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Sept. 15, 2006) (per curiam).
88. Hutchins, supra note 20, at 447.
89. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 220-21.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 221.
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On appeal, the intermediate appellate court rejected Jackson's chal-
lenge to the police use of the GPS device, finding that a warrant was not
required to install and monitor the device.93 However, the Supreme
Court of Washington disagreed with the intermediate appellate court's
conclusion. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the installation
of a GPS tracking device constituted a search or a seizure under the
Washington constitution, which provides that "[n]o person shall be dis-
turbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law."9 4 In holding that a warrant is required, the court did note that the
Washington state constitution is more protective than the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.95 While the court found that GPS
tracking by the government requires a warrant, it did not hold for the
defendant. The court held that there was no constitutional violation
because the police in this case had obtained valid warrants.96
Though the Jackson court did not rely upon the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment case law, its focus on the potential intrusiveness of
the technology was entirely consistent with the directive of the Katz line
of cases.97 The court reasoned that GPS was a "particularly intrusive"
method of surveillance because it did not merely augment a police
officer's senses, such as when using binoculars or a flashlight; rather, it
served as a total technological substitute for visual tracking because the
officer does not actually follow the vehicle once the GPS device is
attached.98 The court further distinguished this technology from simply
following a suspect on public roads, pointing out that police obtained
this uninterrupted GPS information twenty-four hours a day for almost
three full weeks, a time period very unlikely for a police officer to con-
duct standard visual surveillance.99
Most importantly, the court was greatly concerned with the exten-
sive level of personal detail a GPS tracking device provided law
enforcement agents:
Moreover, the intrusion into private affairs made possible with a GPS
device is quite extensive as the information obtained can disclose a
great deal about an individual's life. For example, the device can pro-
vide a detailed record of travel to doctors' offices, banks, gambling
casinos, tanning salons, places of worship, political party meetings,
bars, grocery stores, exercise gyms, places where children are
93. Id. at 222.
94. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 231.
97. Hutchins, supra note 20, at 448.
98. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 222-24.
99. Id. at 223.
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dropped off for school, play, or day care, the upper scale restaurant
and the fast food restaurant, the strip club, the opera, the baseball
game, the "wrong" side of town, the family planning clinic, the labor
rally. In this age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast number of
places that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations, personal
ails and foibles. The GPS tracking devices record all of these travels,
and thus can provide a detailed picture of one's life."°
Given this invasion into private lives and allowance of intimate detail,
the court held a warrant necessary to protect citizens' rights to be free
from government intrusion.101
The year after Jackson, a New York court addressed a case where
police placed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of a burglary
suspect's vehicle. The court here in People v. Lacey also held that the
installation and monitoring of a GPS tracking device without a warrant
violated the New York version of the federal Fourth Amendment.
10 2
Like in Jackson, the court focused on the intrusiveness and invasive
nature of the technology, reasoning that "individuals must be given the
constitutional protections necessary to their continued unfettered free-
dom from a 'big brother' society."' 0 3 The court acknowledged the
diminished expectation of privacy that citizens have in their vehicles on
public roads, however, merely parking a vehicle on a public street does
not give law enforcement the right to surreptitiously attach a tracking
device without a warrant or the owner's consent. °'4 "Other than in the
most exigent circumstances, a person must feel secure that his or her
every movement will not be tracked except upon a warrant based on
probable cause establishing that such a person has been or is about to
commit a crime."' 05 The Lacey court appreciated the importance of tech-
nological advances but realized the larger detriment to society if this
technology abrogated our constitutional protections.1
0 6
Though most case law specific to the warrant requirement for use
of GPS lies in state courts, one federal court has also implied that GPS
tracking devices may fall outside the Knotts precedent and require a
warrant, however, found it unnecessary to resolve that question in its
ruling.' 7 In United States v. Berry, police obtained a court order from a
Baltimore County circuit court to install a GPS tracking device to a sus-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 224.
102. People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. May 6, 2004),
affd, 887 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 2009).
103. Id. at *7.
104. Id. at *8.
105. Id. at *7.
106. Id.
107. See United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004).
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pect's vehicle.' 1 8 Police then used information they received from the
device to obtain a search warrant that led to a finding of narcotics.' 0 9
The federal court did not need to decide whether GPS devices
require a court order because they denied the defendant's suppression
motion, relying upon the valid state-court search warrant." Nonethe-
less, the court did discuss that GPS devices may be more sophisticated
than a beeper and fall outside the beeper precedents. The court distin-
guished modem GPS devices, which can serve as a complete substitute
for police surveillance, from beepers, which merely augment visual sur-
veillance."'I Moreover, the court suggested that due to the advancement
in GPS technology and the substantial amount of information available
through the devices, the Supreme Court might find GPS "so intrusive
that the police must obtain a court order before using it.""' 2
The main line of reasoning from these cases is that even though
GPS devices are considered a type of location-tracking device, they are
distinguishable from previous tracking devices dealt with by courts, such
as beepers. Beepers require actual and contemporaneous police surveil-
lance as they function by merely telling police how close they are to the
target vehicle, based on signal strength." 3 In contrast, GPS devices do
not require police presence in the area to provide data and give the tar-
get's exact coordinates without any additional visual surveillance." 4 By
monitoring through a computer, police can continuously track the target
vehicle as a substitute for actual surveillance in person." 5 Further, GPS
devices are much more intrusive due to their accurate targeting (to
within feet of the target) and their ability to last for lengthy periods of
time.116 As recognized by the Knotts Court, these characteristics of GPS
devices as a whole may equal the "dragnet-type" twenty-four hour sur-
veillance that goes beyond the reach of the federal constitution.11 7
Thus, the main inquiry is whether GPS tracking devices provide
information that intrudes upon an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy. These cases show that courts have clearly found both that it is
108. Id. at 367.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 368.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. State v. Scott, No. 02-02-00121-I, 2006 WL 2640221, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Sept. 15, 2006).
114. State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (en banc).
115. Scott, 2006 WL 2640221, at *6.
116. See, e.g., Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223-24; PACE E-r AL., supra note 4, app. A. at 227.
117. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) ("[I]f such dragnet-type law
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough
then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.").
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an invasion of reasonably expected privacy for the government to track
locations with GPS and that a warrant is necessary to protect the public's
right to privacy under these circumstances.
B. Some Courts Have Held that Warrantless GPS Tracking is
Constitutional, as the Level of Intrusiveness Raises
No Fourth Amendment Concerns
To date, two federal courts and one state court have explicitly
found that law enforcement's surreptitious use of GPS devices against
suspects did not raise any Fourth Amendment concerns. In the first of
these cases, United States v. Moran,11 8 narcotics agents installed a GPS
tracking device on the defendant's car, without first obtaining a warrant,
and monitored its movement for the next two days. 119 Prior to trial, the
defendant moved to suppress any evidence obtained through the war-
rantless use of the device.1 20 The court denied the motion and held there
was no Fourth Amendment violation. 2 ' In support of this holding, the
Moran court relied solely on Knotts dicta that the defendant had no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy while traveling on public thorough-
fares.122 The court failed to offer any further reasoning or analysis
outside of simply citing this authority and criticizing the New York
court in Lacey for not considering Knotts in its decision. 123 Additionally,
the Moran court did not address or consider any differences between the
beeper used in Knotts and the much more advanced and intrusive GPS
device at issue in Moran. The court merely treated use of the GPS
device as indistinguishable from mere visual surveillance.2 4
After Moran, in People v. Gant, the Westchester County Court of
New York also refused to recognize any Fourth Amendment concerns
by law enforcement's use of a GPS tracking device. 125 The Gant court
addressed a defendant's challenge to police officers' warrantless attach-
ment and use of a GPS device that was placed on the defendant's recrea-
tional vehicle. 26 Following Knotts and Moran, the court reasoned that a
person traveling on public thoroughfares has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place to another. 127 With the
118. 349 F. Supp. 2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
119. Id. at 467.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 468.
122. Id. at 467 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).
123. See id. (citing People v. Lacey, No. 236N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
May 6, 2004)).
124. See id.
125. 802 N.Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2005).
126. Id. at 845.
127. See id. at 847.
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defendant having no reasonable expectation of privacy, the court held
that no search or seizure occurred and there were no Fourth Amendment
implications from use of the device. 128 Like in Moran, the court relied
on Knotts, but failed to address the intrusive capabilities of modem GPS
devices. The court merely assumed that this new technology is analo-
gous to beeper technology without discussing the clear differences.
1 29
The most recent GPS case in which a court rejected the warrant
requirement came from Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Garcia.1 30 In Garcia, police, without a warrant, placed a GPS
"memory tracking unit" underneath the bumper of defendant's car when
it was parked on a public street.13 ' This device "receive[d] and store[d]
satellite signals that indicate[d] the device's location. So when the police
later retrieved the device ... they were able to learn the car's travel
history since the installation of the device."1 32 The information gained
from the device eventually led to a finding of defendant's participation
in crimes relating to the manufacturing of methamphetamine.133 Defen-
dant moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the tracking
device as the fruit of an unconstitutional search.
134
Posner rejected defendant's challenge and thoroughly criticized a
warrant requirement for GPS devices. 135 Posner first found it untenable
that attachment of the GPS tracking device constituted a seizure, as no
meaningful interference occurred with the defendant's possession of the
vehicle. 136 Next, Posner established that the police activity did not
amount to a search either.1 37 Posner asserted that GPS tracking is
equivalent to the use of beeper technology present in Knotts, and there-
fore should not be considered a search. 138 Posner did recognize the vast
amount of information that may be gathered through warrantless GPS
tracking and also addressed that the Fourth Amendment must move
ahead as technology advances. 139 However, Posner cautioned that
greater security often comes at the cost of privacy, and, thus, no warrant
128. Id.
129. See id. at. 846-47.
130. 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).




135. Id. at 996-98.
136. Id. at 996 ("The device did not affect the car's driving qualities, did not draw power from
the car's engine or battery, did not take up room that might otherwise have been occupied by
passengers or packages, did not even alter the car's appearance, and in short did not 'seize' the car
in any intelligible sense of the word.").
137. Id. at 997.




is necessary for this activity."
On the whole, the courts in this line of cases mainly reach their
conclusions by evading the question of whether such tracking constitutes
a more substantial intrusion on privacy than previously considered forms
of surveillance. The courts have equated GPS technology with beeper
surveillance of the past without any reasoning or analysis of the compar-
isons between the two. Moreover, a major issue revolves around what
specific type of GPS tracking device is being used by police. For exam-
ple, in Garcia, the GPS device was a memory-tracking unit that simply
received and stored satellite signals, which indicated the device's loca-
tion. 14 1 In order for police to obtain any desired information, they had to
physically go and retrieve the device to learn the car's travel history.142
This type of device differs greatly from GPS devices that transmit loca-
tion information in real time over the computer. When faced with a case
involving real-time GPS tracking by police, courts may recognize that
more protection is required due to the larger risk of intrusion.'43
C. The Statutory Debate over Governmental Access to Prospective,
Real-time Cellular Phone Site Information
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986 is
currently the most influential legislation governing electronic surveil-
lance issues. Congress intended Title I of the ECPA to address the inter-
ception of wire, electronic, and oral communications.!" 4 Congress
created Title II to deal with government access to "stored wire and elec-
tronic communications and transactional records." '145 Title III addresses
"pen registers and trap and trace devices." 14 6 These three titles within
the ECPA have been interpreted as setting out four separate categories
of legal requirements for governmental officials to receive judicial
authorization to obtain various types of cell site information from third-
party service providers: super warrants, probable cause, specific and
articulable facts, and a lower standard of mere relevancy. 47
First, Title I provides the greatest level of protection for cellular
140. See id.
141. Id. at 995.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., People v. Obujen, No. H026715, 2005 WL 519233, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. May 7,
2005); State v. Scott, No. 02-02-00121-1, 2006 WL 2640221, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Sept. 15, 2006); People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004),
aff'd, 887 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 2009); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003).
144. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Rickey G. Glover, Note, A Probable Nightmare: Lifting the Fog from the Cellular
Surveillance Statutory Catastrophe, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1543, 1558 (2007).
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communications, forcing the government to meet super warrant require-
ments before intercepting phone conversation content.' 48 Second, the
government's burden for obtaining customer records concerning elec-
tronic communication service or remote computing service, discussed in
Title II of the ECPA, is a showing of specific and articulable facts
regarding the government's need for the information.' 49 Third, the
authority required for governmental use of tracking devices is a showing
of probable cause pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.150
Fourth, to obtain information from a pen register or trap and trace
device, the government must simply demonstrate the material is relevant
to an ongoing criminal investigation. 1 5
The current debate centers around the appropriate legal standard
required for obtaining prospective, real-time cell site information from
third-party cellular service providers. This standard depends on what
aspect of the ECPA the court believes is implicated. Recent cases on the
topic have begun to establish the general consensus that the government
cannot obtain cell tower site location information solely under the pen
register statute. 152 Thus, the main division amongst courts is whether the
data should be treated like a tracking device, requiring probable cause,
or whether the data should be treated as subscriber records, requiring
specific and articulable facts.
1. SOME COURTS HAVE HELD THAT A PROBABLE CAUSE SHOWING IS
REQUIRED FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TO OBTAIN CELLULAR
LOCATION INFORMATION FROM SERVICE PROVIDERS
As this cellular technology was emerging, police began to request
orders for cell phone tracking information, and magistrate judges rou-
tinely approved the requests without comment. 53 In August of 2005, the
Eastern District of New York became the first district court to fully
examine the issue. In the Orenstein Opinion, the government requested
real-time cell site information by way of a pen register and a trap and
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006).
149. See id. § 2703(d).
150. See id. § 3117(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2).
152. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a
Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 599
(W.D. Pa. 2008) [hereinafter Lenihan Order]; In re Application of the U.S. for an Order
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & Authorizing Release of
Subscriber Info. &Ior Cell Site Info., 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter
Orenstein Opinion].
153. See Orenstein Opinion, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 566 (describing how magistrate judges in other
jurisdictions are being confronted with the same issue but have not yet achieved consensus on how
to resolve it and urging appropriate review of the orders).
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trace device. 154 Judge Orenstein admitted that he granted such requests
in the past without questioning the legal basis. 55 However, this time he
rejected this request and concluded that such orders for real-time cell
site information were illegal without a showing of probable cause.1
56
Soon after Judge Orenstein's opinion, Judge Smith in the Southern
District of Texas issued an opinion that reached the same conclusion
based on a different explanation."5 7 Judge Smith held that prospective,
real-time cell site information fits exclusively into the tracking device
category, requiring no less than probable cause. 58 Judge Smith further
noted that this technology may raise Fourth Amendment privacy con-
cerns if phones are monitored within an individual's home without her
knowledge. 159
Numerous district courts in Maryland, District of Columbia, New
York, Indiana, and Wisconsin followed suit, and, over the next three
years, eleven opinions were published each holding the government can
only obtain prospective, real-time cell site information after receiving a
court order based on a showing of probable cause. 160 The most recent
154. Id. at 563.
155. Id. at 566.
156. Id. at 564-65 (holding that the information the government requested would turn the
targeted phone into a tracking device, or "an electronic device ... which permits the tracking of
movement of a person or object" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3117(b))).
157. See In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750-57 (S.D. Tex. 2005) [hereinafter Smith Opinion].
158. Smith Opinion, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
159. Id. at 765.
160. See McLaughlin, supra note 40, at 422-24 & n. 11 (summarizing that eleven of the fifteen
cell phone location tracking decisions published in the last two years concluded probable cause is
required). The eleven decisions are: In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the
Release of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2006); In re Application of
the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Info., 412 F. Supp. 2d
947 (E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation &
Use of a Pen Register &/or Trap & Trace for Mobile Identification No. (585) 111-1111 & the
Disclosure of Subscriber & Activity Info. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211
(W.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of
a Pen Register with Caller Identification Device & Cell Site Location Auth. on a Certain Cellular
Tel., 415 F. Supp. 2d 663 (S.D.W. Va. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for Orders Authorizing
the Installation & Use of Pen Registers & Caller Identification Devices on Tel. Nos. [Sealed] &
[Sealed], 416 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order:
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; Authorizing the
Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; & Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Based Servs.,
No. I:06-MC-6, 2006 WL 1876847 (N.D. Ind. Jul. 5, 2006); In re Application for an Order
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Directing the Disclosure of Telecomms.
Records for Cellular Phone Assigned the No. [Sealed], 439 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D. Md. 2006); In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap &
Trace Device or Process, Access to Customer Records, & Cell Phone Tracking, 441 F. Supp. 2d
816 (S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site
Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., No. 06 Crim. Misc. 01, 2006 WL 468300 (S.D.N.Y.
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published opinion to hold probable cause as the standard for cellular site
records came from Judge Lenihan in the Western District of
Pennsylvania. 161
As courts started to publish opinions in this area, it appeared that a
probable cause standard would become the settled consensus. However,
courts soon published opinions reaching the opposite conclusion. Now, a
majority of courts require probable cause for these orders, but disagree-
ment still exists among the courts.
2. SOME COURTS HAVE HELD THAT A LOWER BURDEN OF SPECIFIC
AND ARTICULABLE FACTS IS REQUIRED FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TO
OBTAIN CELLULAR LOCATION INFORMATION FROM SERVICE PROVIDERS
Judge Gorenstein of the Southern District of New York produced
the first opinion that reached the conclusion that probable cause was not
a required for cell site information. 162 In that case, the government
requested real-time information tied to calls from the telephone user, but
only sought information from one cell site at a time. 163 Judge Gorenstein
accepted the government's dual-authority argument that such informa-
tion is available when combining the pen register statute with the Stored
Communications Act (SCA), by way of the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). 1'6 Soon after, the Western District
of Louisiana adopted Judge Gorenstein's analysis and allowed the gov-
ernment to receive the same information.165
Next, the Southern District of West Virginia rejected the dual-
authority position, but allowed the government to obtain real-time track-
ing information based on specific and articulable facts. 166 Most recently,
Feb. 28, 2006); Orenstein Opinion, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562; Smith Opinion, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747; In
re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & a
Caller Identification System on Tel. Nos. [sealed] & [sealed] & the Production of Real Time Cell
Site Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 2005).
161. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 616 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that
access to records could not be obtained on simple showing of articulable relevance to ongoing
investigation and the correct standard is probable cause under Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 41).
162. See In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. Records &
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
[hereinafter Gorenstein Opinion].
163. Id. at 437-38.
164. Id. at 448-49.
165. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order: Authorizing the Installation & Use of a
Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device & Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &Ior Cell Site
Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (W.D. La. 2006) (accepting the government's dual-authority
position).
166. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen
Register with Caller Identification Device & Cell Site Location Auth. on a Certain Cellular Tel.,
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a judge from the Southern District of Texas and a second judge from the
Southern District of New York both held that real-time cell site informa-
tion was obtainable without a showing of probable cause.' 67
As courts have furthered arguments for both positions based on a
complex statutory backdrop, the current situation remains a live disa-
greement regarding a significant tool used in police investigations. Fur-
ther, commentators assert that if the issue is not settled, judges may
simply continue to grant these orders without comment. 68 The neces-
sary evidentiary standard must be decided, whether it may be a showing
of probable cause, or something less.
V. GPs TRACKING AND CELLULAR PHONE TRACKING IS A SEARCH
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, REQUIRING
POLICE TO OBTAIN A WARRANT BEFORE USE
To determine whether the Fourth Amendment limits police use of
GPS and cellular location surveillance methods, we must consider
whether the individual being monitored has behaved in a manner that
suggests a desire for privacy, and whether the intrusiveness of the tech-
nology is significant enough to trigger Fourth Amendment concerns. As
discussed below, these questions can be answered in the affirmative
based on the existing constitutional framework and the lower and state
courts' analysis of the issues.
A. GPS Tracking
Governmental use of GPS devices as a means of obtaining vehicle
location information constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment
because the intrusive nature of the technology and the detail of informa-
tion transmitted invade upon individuals' reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy. Therefore, law-enforcement agents should be required to provide a
warrant based on probable cause before using this technology.
Again, the basic Katz inquiry that the Court will conduct when fac-
ing a challenge to a new technology is as follows, "first that a person
have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasona-
ble."" 69 For constitutional protection to be appropriate, both the subjec-
415 F. Supp. 2d 663, 666 (S.D.W. Va. 2006) (focusing on the fact that the fugitive was using
another person's mobile phone and thus was not considered a subscriber under CALEA).
167. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on
a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Application of the U.S.
for an Order: Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, &
Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info., 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
168. Samuel, supra note 48, at 1329-30.
169. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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tive and objective prongs must be satisfied. In the context of GPS
location tracking, the Supreme Court should find that individuals have
met this test.
The first prong of the analysis requires a showing that the individ-
ual has behaved in a manner that is consistent with a desire for pri-
vacy. 7 ' This element could be satisfied where law enforcement tracks
an individual through an attached GPS device in his or her vehicle. The
obvious obstacle to satisfying the first prong, with respect to driving in a
vehicle, is that "[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thor-
oughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another."'' It is clear that others are able to view
parts of our travels as we pass by on a public street. However, the pow-
erful GPS tracking technology goes well beyond this expected level into
an area that most people would consider private. This argument is also
strengthened by the fact that the police conduct GPS tracking surveil-
lance for extended periods of time. 72 It is very unlikely that any mem-
ber of our society believes that merely parking a vehicle on a public
street gives law enforcement the right to surreptitiously attach a tracking
device without a warrant or consent. Moreover, it is even more improba-
ble that a person would expect to be tracked continuously, twenty-four
hours a day, for weeks or months at a time, while a GPS device records
all of these travels and thus provides a detailed picture of her private
life. 73 Most drivers would be shocked, if not outraged, to learn that law
enforcement has the ability to conduct these activities without any judi-
cial intervention. In GPS tracking cases with this factual scenario, it is
likely that a defendant can overcome the subjective-expectation-of-pri-
vacy prong of the analysis.
The second prong of the Katz inquiry requires a court to determine
that a defendant's expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable,
meaning it is one that society is also willing to deem "reasonable."' 74
Additionally, when reviewing this prong, the Supreme Court has consid-
ered the level of intrusiveness of the surveillance method, looking spe-
cifically to the information that it exposes. 75
When dealing with GPS tracking devices, the objective prong of
Katz can be satisfied by looking at the intrusive nature of the technology
170. Id.
171. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
172. See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 220-21 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (describing how the
police tracked the defendant's car for nearly a month after attaching a GPS tracking device).
173. See id. at 223 (detailing the powerful capabilities of GPS tracking devices and the privacy
concerns arising from police usage).
174. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
175. See id. at 352 (majority opinion); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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and the magnitude of information it reveals. Though GPS devices are
known as a type of location tracking device, they are far more advanced
than the surveillance methods the Supreme Court has previously
addressed. Most notably, this technology is distinguishable from beeper
technology, which the Court has characterized as merely sense-aug-
menting. 17 6 Beepers require actual and contemporaneous police surveil-
lance, as they function by merely telling how close the police are to the
target vehicle based on signal strength. 177 On the contrary, GPS devices
do not require police presence in the area; they provide the target's exact
coordinates without any additional visual surveillance.178 Through com-
puter monitoring, police can continuously track the target vehicle for
lengthy periods of time as a substitute for visual surveillance.' 79 This
information is also automatically saved onto the computer database so it
is accessible to law enforcement at any time, even months or years
later.' 8° Moreover, in Knotts, the Court specifically addressed the dis-
tinction between beeper technology and more intrusive technology. The
Court stated that its holding was narrow and should not apply to "drag-
net-type" twenty-four-hour surveillance of individuals.' 8 ' The character-
istics of GPS technology, as a whole, differ from mere sense-
augmentation at issue in Knotts and place GPS in the category of tech-
nology that the Court believed might go beyond the reach of the federal
constitution.
For these reasons, GPS surveillance technology better fits into the
Court's extrasensory surveillance category, one that requires the proce-
dural safeguard of a warrant prior to police use. 182 In fact, some courts
that have dealt with GPS tracking have advocated treating this technol-
ogy as extrasensory because it operates as a substitute for actual human
surveillance.' 83 The extensive level of information collectable through
the use of GPS tracking devices without need for visual surveillance, the
accuracy of this technology, and the length of uninterrupted surveillance
176. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
177. See State v. Scott, No. 02-02-00121-1, 2006 WL 2640221, at *5-6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Sept. 15, 2006) (distinguishing beepers from GPS technology).
178. See Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
179. Scott, 2006 WL 2640221, at *6.
180. Id.
181. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284 ("tlIf such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.").
182. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("Where ... the Government uses a
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.").
183. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004); Jackson, 76
P.3d at 223.
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substantiates characterizing the technology as extrasensory and provid-
ing some constitutional limitation on law-enforcement use.
Furthermore, use of GPS technology is quickly increasing as
devices become more affordable and available. Widespread police use of
such a powerful technology without judicial supervision could lead to
abuse of these devices and trigger the assumption that one's movements
are being tracked and recorded at any given moment. This can poten-
tially lead individuals to alter their behavior to accommodate this
perception.
The Fourth Amendment protects the features of society that pre-
serve privacy. The original technological inquiry the Court has used
since Katz informs us that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information that police collect through GPS surveillance
methods. Thus, law enforcement use of GPS tracking technology is a
search, requiring a warrant based on probable cause. With these safe-
guards in place, judges would ensure that police track a suspect's loca-
tion only when they possess sufficient justification and only for a period
of time appropriate to the purposes of the investigation.
B. Cellular Phone Tracking
Like GPS tracking, government acquisition of cellular phone site
location information constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment
because it invades upon individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy.
Therefore, government agents should be required to provide a warrant
based on probable cause before accessing this information.
First, a major privacy concern, which must be addressed, arises
because cellular site location information implicates the Fourth Amend-
ment right of privacy in the home. The Supreme Court has clearly recog-
nized the right to privacy in the home as a core Fourth Amendment
principle. 84 The Court has also indicated that an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy exists within the home' 85 and that collecting data
about what takes place inside a home constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment. 86 This presents a key problem in the context of cell
phone location tracking. When law enforcement agents seek cellular
location information, they cross the line by learning facts about the inte-
rior of the home, which is clearly illegal without a warrant. Because
cellular phones travel with the user at all times, they are constantly in
184. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
185. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984) ("[Plrivate residences are places
in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by




and out of private places, most importantly homes.187 Cell phone track-
ing cannot help but implicate the home, as it would be exceedingly diffi-
cult to only track a suspect while he was outside the home. Thus, since
cell phone tracking will implicate the right of privacy in the home, a
warrant should be necessary before engaging in such tracking.
Cellular phone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their cellular location information that satisfies the two-prong Katz test.
First, the subjective portion of the inquiry would almost certainly be
met. Many mobile phone users are unaware that law enforcement agents
have the ability to track their cellular location information. Further, most
cell phone users would surely be astonished, if not angered, to learn that
law-enforcement agents can also acquire this information without first
obtaining a warrant. A cell phone user understandably views their loca-
tion information as private and expects it to remain private. 18 8 As with
GPS tracking, cell phone tracking provides an in-depth view into all of a
user's private activities and movements, which certainly include a sub-
jective expectation of privacy.
Next, society would determine that a user's expectation of privacy
in her cell site location information is objectively reasonable. As dis-
cussed, this information reveals details about the inside of the home. The
Court has established that society is prepared to recognize expectations
of privacy in the home as justifiable.' 89 Thus, when the home is impli-
cated, the objective prong of the Katz test is satisfied. Moreover, even
cellular location information that conveys details about activities outside
the home still intrudes upon a user's reasonable expectation of privacy.
Though outside of the home, cellular phones follow the user continu-
ously throughout the day, either outside or in private buildings. Law
enforcement agents obtain immense detail of the user's daily activities
by simply tracking the user's cell location, much of which is sensitive in
nature and thought to be private. Similar to GPS tracking, the informa-
tion obtained from this powerful technology can prove very intrusive
when used continuously for long periods of time. Moreover, a majority
of the lower courts have taken notice of these important characteristics,
holding that a showing of no less than probable cause is the requisite
standard for obtaining this cellular location information, with several
explicitly finding or strongly implying a reasonable expectation of pri-
187. In fact, many users have cancelled their landline phones and solely use their cellular
phones for all communication. Randazzo, supra note 30.
188. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 735 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("As a
general matter, the private citizen is entitled to assume, and in fact does assume, that his
possessions are not infected with concealed electronic devices.").
189. See id. at 714 (majority opinion).
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vacy in this information.' 9"
Further, when outside the home, cellular phones usually travel in
the user's pocket or pocketbook and do not remain in public view. This
differentiates the technology and the associated expectation of privacy
from beeper cases on public roads. 9 ' The scenario where police obtain
cellular location information is more analogous to the situation in Karo,
where a warrant was required prior to monitoring a beeper that had been
"withdrawn from the public view." ' 2
Lastly, cellular location information cases cannot be analyzed using
the assumption of risk framework from Smith v. Maryland, which held
that one cannot expect privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to
third parties.' 9 3 To apply Smith to cellular tracking, the Court must
establish that mobile phone users are aware their location may be
tracked and, therefore, assume the risk of continued use. At this time, the
Court would not be able to make such a determination. Many users have
never considered how their cellular phones work and are unaware that
their location can be tracked. Thus, without knowledge of the possible
conveyance of information to third-party law-enforcement agents, these
cell phone users are not assuming any risk. However, even with future
widespread awareness of these capabilities, the information at hand dif-
fers greatly from that present in Smith. The Smith Court focused on the
limited nature of the information revealed through use of a pen register,
characterizing a pen register as a sense-augmenting device because it
discloses solely the number that has been dialed.' 94 In contrast, cell
phone tracking provides information beyond the numbers dialed, includ-
ing the contents of the calls; this level of detail crosses the line and falls
within the purview of the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, since access to cellular phone site location informa-
tion invades upon individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy and
should be deemed a search, government agents must be required to pro-
vide a warrant based on probable cause before accessing this informa-
tion. Judicial authorization would ensure proper, justifiable tracking and
protect cell phone users from potential governmental abuse. It is clear
that law-enforcement agents can access this cellular location informa-
190. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
191. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (finding there was no legitimate
expectation of privacy while traveling in plain view on public roadways).
192. Karo, 468 U.S. at 718.
193. 442 U.S. 735, 744-46 (1979); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
194. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (explaining that pen registers did not indicate the actual content of




tion; however, a warrant requirement will ensure they do not circumvent
the Fourth Amendment in doing so.
VI. CONCLUSION
Striking the proper balance between individual privacy and the
need for protection in the post-9/11 era is a difficult task in a world of
ever-increasing technology. The emerging surveillance methods of GPS
tracking and cellular phone location tracking provide law-enforcement
officers with a variety of ways to complete their objective more effi-
ciently. However, substantial Fourth Amendment concerns are raised by
law enforcement's ability to so scrupulously monitor individuals via
these technologies without a warrant. Further, because the majority of
Americans voluntarily carry cell phones and voluntarily drive cars on a
daily basis, these tracking methods are very different from tracking in
the past.
Under the traditional Katz inquiry, governmental use of both GPS
devices and cell phone tracking, as a means of obtaining location infor-
mation, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore,
law-enforcement agents should be required to provide a warrant based
on probable cause before using this technology. The intrusive nature of
the technologies and the detail of information transmitted invade upon
individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy. Moreover, cell phone
tracking implicates the most fundamental Fourth Amendment privacy
concern, the right to privacy in the home. Requiring a warrant based on
probable cause would save citizens from a world of embarrassment, fear,
and privacy invasion.
Due to the severely conflicting views of the lower and state courts,
the Supreme Court will likely address these technologies in the near
future. Let us hope the Court makes the correct decision, and the police
properly use these technologies with the safeguard of a warrant
requirement.
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